| Time |
Title |
Content |
| 0:50 |
Introduction |
| Many explanations have been offered as to why the royalists lost The First Civil War. They often tend to fall into one of two categories. |
| 0: 59 |
Structural |
The first category is the structural explanation that the longer the war lasted, the more likely the royalists were to be defeated owing to the superior resources of money and manpower at parliament’s disposal. |
| 01:14 |
Military |
The second argument is that the royalists lost the first civil war, not because of any structural weaknesses in their war effort, but because their armies were defeated in the decisive summer campaign of 1645 at the battles of Naseby, Langport and a host of other smaller engagements. Allied to this view is that the king was indecisive and ill-advised, particularly by favourites lacking military experience or acumen, such as Lord George Digby. |
| 01:45 |
|
So, these are the two themes, then; one military explanation, looking at battles and generalship and the other looking at the structural weaknesses in the royalist cause, that it had less resources than Parliament, that it was more likely to lose should the war drag out and grow longer. |
| 02:06 |
Royalist structural weakness |
So, let’s look at that first theme. Let us examine the evidence for the royalists being at a serious, strategic disadvantage. |
| 02:16 |
London |
Parliamentarian activists controlled Westminster and the City of London. Then, as now, London dominated England. This gave them the ability to control the central fundraising mechanisms of the state, and to negotiate loans from the City of London that far outstripped the financial resources the royalists were able to draw upon. This was so important because the ability to equip, clothe, feed and pay soldiers became increasingly critical once that initial wave of volunteer’s enthusiasm wore out. |
| 02.54 |
The Navy |
Parliament also controlled nearly all of the pre-war English navy, whose admiral was the influential parliamentarian peer, Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick. This enabled parliament to develop superior systems of logistics and supply, to be able to deliver money, manpower and materials to coastal fortresses deep within royalist held territory such as Plymouth, Lyme Regis and Hull. |
| 03:26 |
Parliamentarian powerbase in the South-East |
Royalists tended to be more successful at mobilising men and resources in the poorer regions of Britain, for example, Wales, Cornwall, the West Country and northern England. Parliament, on the other hand, controlled the richer and more heavily populated areas in the south and eastern parts of England, and this formed for them an intact powerbase rarely penetrated by royalist forces. |
| 03:58 |
Foreign Intervention |
The royalists proved less successful in mobilising foreign military intervention. Parliament’s treaty with the Scots procured the intervention of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant in spring 1644. This was a mighty field army over 20,000 men strong that did much to overthrow the previous royalist dominance in northern England. This was a decisive boost to the parliamentarian war effort: from then on, royalist armies increasingly found themselves outnumbered in the major engagements. |
| 04:35 |
‘English’men |
In contrast to Parliament’s alliance with Scotland, the king’s recall of royal regiments serving in Ireland to support him in England never amounted to more than 9,000 men, and these arrived in small batches of piecemeal reinforcements rather than as a marching army, like the Scots. The presence of soldiers perceived to be Irish amongst the royalist forces was a propaganda victory for Parliament. London news-books proclaimed that the king had brought over native Irishmen who were guilty of massacring Protestant settlers, to do the same to his English subjects. There is evidence that this claim, however distorted and exaggerated, unsettled many royalists and made them think twice about their royalism.
By the third year of war, the royalists fell behind the parliamentarians in recruiting and maintaining their infantry formations. As the territory royalists controlled contracted, they found recruitment increasingly difficult and grew ever more reliant on the Welsh, Cornish and royal troops recalled from Ireland. Mark Stoyle has argued that this enabled Parliament and its New Model Army to pose as champions of Englishness, in contrast to a royalism that had become increasingly dependent on ethnic diversity in its armies. According to the petitions so far published on the CWP website, around half of the royalist maimed soldiers that mentioned Naseby in their later petitions were Welsh and most of the other half were from English counties bordering Wales, such as Cheshire, Shropshire and Herefordshire. |
| 06:30 |
Royalist Plunder |
Ronald Hutton has suggested, then, that as the royalist cause declined, their military commanders made ever more rapacious demands on the contracting base of civilian support in which their forces were quartered. Demands for food, money and shelter fell directly onto civilians, who increasingly withheld their co-operation, or even participated in clubmen uprisings in defence of their homes and property. A collapse of active support for the royalists in their own heartlands therefore accelerated their demise. In the west country the cavalry of George Goring’s army became known as ‘Goring’s crew’ by late 1645, with a reputation for plunder that turned other royalists against them. |
| 07:24 |
Royalist leadership culture |
Setbacks to the royalist cause were worsened by the cult of honour among royalist commanders, many of whom responded badly to reverses. Many were prone to a divisive vindictiveness, personal recrimination, allegations of treachery, even duelling and violence against former comrades following a defeat. Unlike parliamentarians, who had many different figureheads, committees, and institutions to appeal to, when royalist commanders were discredited, they often had little reason to redouble their efforts, as disfavour with the king often proved final. After his defeat at the battle of Marston Moor, the marquis of Newcastle chose exile rather than suffering the ridicule of the court. Rupert’s honour proved incompatible with further royalist service after his surrender of Bristol in 1645. |
| 08:26 |
Decisive defeat in battle |
So now let’s turn to some of the military reasons why the King lost The First Civil War. Battles are important as military historians remind us. In contrast to these arguments you’ve just heard about inherent royalist structural weaknesses, the recent books by Malcolm Wanklyn stress the Civil Wars were battlefield events and that these impacted heavily on the outcome of The First Civil War. |
| 08:59 |
There was a thriving royalist army in 1645 |
During 1645, rather than being in terminal decline, the royalist war effort was alive and well. For instance, Ian Atherton has shown us how the royalist garrison at Lichfield was better maintained, administered and supplied in 1645 than it had been two years earlier in 1643. Mark Stoyle has shown how renewed mass recruitment for the royalist cause was still possible in places such as Cornwall in the summer of 1645, with the raising of the New Cornish Tertia by Sir Richard Grenville. |
| 09:39 |
A royalist victory at Naseby was not impossible |
It was once suggested that the royalists had ‘committed suicide’ at Naseby by attacking uphill against a force that was nearly double its own size. Recent work by Glenn Ford, Martin Marix Evans and the Naseby Battlefield Project suggests this inevitability is misplaced. The forces were not so unevenly matched. Most of the New Model Army’s infantry were untried conscripts, and they were badly shaken by the royalist attack. Their commander, General Skippon was badly wounded, General Ireton was captured and, at one point, prospects of a parliamentarian victory looked remote. So, Naseby was perhaps more of a close-run thing than has been suggested |
| 10:26 |
New Model Army victories. |
Also, The New Model Army’s victory at the battle of Langport a month later is often overlooked in the narrative of The Civil War. In this battle Sir Thomas Fairfax and The New Model Army defeated a larger royalist army than that of the King at Naseby and this prevented George Goring’s army being reinforced by the Cornish under Sir Richard Grenville. We see the importance of this from Fairfax’s letter to his father after the battle of Langport, on the 10th July 1645, in which he said ‘we cannot esteem this mercy less, all things considered, than that of Naseby fight’ : |
| 11:10 |
Superior parliamentarian strategy and discipline. |
So, after the victories at Naseby and Langport, Fairfax did not disperse the New Model Army into winter quarters, as his predecessor the Earl of Essex had done. Now, possessing both the finances and the will, he maintained the pressure on the remaining royalist forces and allowed them little time to recover. He developed better relations with civilian populations, owing to the superior pay and discipline of his forces. He persuaded the Somerset clubmen movement to align with him. His campaign to reduce the Cornish royalists was tactful, paying their surrendering soldiers to go home and lay down their arms, rather than taking revenge on them for Cornwall’s royalist activism. When it became clear that he was not intending to punish the Cornish, many of the royalist gentry in Cornwall made terms with a treaty at Millbrook, leaving the royalist General, Ralph Hopton isolated and with little choice but to surrender soon after. |
| 12:20 |
Battlefield terrain |
A new focus on landscape history has done much to shed new light on the decisive battlefield moments of The Civil Wars, as field-walking, terrain reconstruction and battlefield archaeology have deepened our understanding of the awful, bloody and confused affairs that civil war battles were. So, we should not neglect the role played by the English countryside in deciding the outcome of The Civil Wars. It is important to remember that the landscape wasn’t the backdrop for all of these military events, the landscape itself shaped them, so its worth understanding more about the historical terrain over which these battles were fought. For instance, fresh examination of the historical terrain at Naseby demonstrates that Cromwell’s cavalry were drawn up very deeply over a narrow front, hemmed in by a rabbit warren. This meant that the ground was covered in holes from the rabbit’s burrows, making it dangerous for horses’ hooves. It could therefore be argued that Cromwell’s much celebrated control over his troopers was as much dictated by the landscape as by any legendary puritanical discipline that is often attributed to them. Cromwell was able to defeat the royalist northern horse under Marmaduke Langdale, ranged against him, and then have his troopers intervene against the royalist infantry purely because his cavalry outnumbered Langdale’s 2 to 1, and was drawn up in much, much deeper formations. |
| News Management |
| We should also consider news management as a prime factor in Parliament’s victory |
| 14.08 |
Printed propaganda |
Jason Peacey, Joad Raymond and other historians have shown how parliament proved more adept at utilising print, propaganda and ‘paper bullets’ to bolster their cause. The royalists were instinctively reticent about appealing for popular support in print. And we can see this in a famous quote from one of their generals, Sir Marmaduke Langdale:
‘The Parliament is far too nimble for the King in printing; the common people believe the first story which makes impression in their minds, and it cannot be beaten out.’
But, in time, the royalists overcame this reserve and they did manage to produce the celebrated serial weekly newsbook Mercurius Aulicus. But their provincial presses in Oxford and York could never match the sheer volume of parliamentarian output coming from London. Print was able to mobilise the anti-Catholic prejudices of many English subjects into supporting war against their king, a king who became widely regarded as irretrievably untrustworthy after his duplicitous correspondence, captured at Naseby, was published soon after the battle in the pamphlet The King’s Cabinet Opened. |
| Military Intelligence |
| 15:34 |
Spies |
A recent book by John Ellis, To Walk in the Dark, has argued that part of the reason for the royalist defeat was that parliamentarians developed superior systems of military intelligence and espionage. This proved important in the prelude to the decisive battles of 1645 as well as in undermining several important royalist garrisons.
Sir Thomas Fairfax wrote to Speaker Lenthall at Nottingham on 17 February 1647 requesting that Parliament reward John Tarrant with a livelihood for him and his family for his scouting service in 1645. Fairfax remarked that Tarrant ‘very often hazarded his life in bringing me from the Enemies Quarters exact Intelligence of their affaires’
Tarrant had been sent to General Goring in the west by Secretary Nicholas at Oxford. When he returned to Oxford, Tarrant was sent to the King with all the papers and details about Goring’s campaign in the west and the state of Oxford. Instead, Tarrant changed sides, and presented all this to Fairfax right before the battle of Naseby. This enabled the New Model Army’s swifter relief of Taunton ‘which otherwise would probablie have been lost’. Fairfax wrote this was ‘a seasonable and remarkable service unto the kingdome’ |
| Side-Changing |
| 17:07 |
Treachery |
My book Turncoats and Renegadoes, on the subject of side-changing, argues that the military strategies of both sides at the very highest level so frequently hinged upon securing the surrender of towns and fortresses by encouraging their commanders to change sides. Whilst he was imprisoned in the tower of London, the future parliamentarian general, George Monck wrote in Observations on Military and Political Affairs that the best way to take a town was ‘By treachery.’ When presented with their best chance of decisive victory, in the summer of 1643, the royalist sieges of Hull, Gloucester and Plymouth hinged on this strategy, but in each case their hopes proved misplaced. |
| 17:58 |
|
In contrast, by 1645, parliament’s attempts to gain ground through subverting royalist garrison commanders began to pay off. Local disputes between royalists led to alienation and defections amongst those the king decided against. While treachery did not ultimately cause the royalists to lose the war, by 1645 it clearly accelerated a loss of support in their heartlands. There was quarrelling and subversion within many royalist garrisons in the Western Marches, Wales and the West Midlands which robbed the king of his capacity to rebuild after Naseby. As towns such as Shrewsbury, Monmouth and Hereford fell to Parliament, royalist frustrations turned inwards, with garrison commanders demanding court martials and threatening duels to vindicate their honour. A fatalism crept in amongst the royalists that treachery was their undoing
Alexander Brome was a Drset poet and lawyer who composed 200 poem satires attacking enemies of Charles I. His poem, On the Loss of a Garrison, a Meditation, illustrates this fatalism that crept into the royalist cause after Naseby.
‘Town after town, field after field,
This turns, and that perfidiously doth yield:
He’s banded on the traitorous thought of those
That, Janus like, look to him and his foes.
In vain are bulwarks, and the strongest hold,
If the besieger’s bullets are made of gold…
Trust not in friends, for friends will soon deceive thee
They are in nothing sure, but sure to leave thee.’ |
| Reaction to defeat |
| 19:46 |
Royalist cult of honour |
So, the parliamentarians and royalists reacted differently to battlefield setbacks and defeat. After the destruction of his infantry at the Battle of Marston Moor, the royalist viceroy of the north, William Cavendish, Marquess of Newcastle took ship with some of his officers into exile in Europe, reflecting ‘he could not endure the laughter of the court’. After the Restoration, Newcastle’s wife, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, wrote extensively to clear her husband from blame for the loss of the royalist North:
‘That it is remarkable that in all actions and undertakings when my Lord was in person himself he was always victorious, and prospered in the execution of his designs. Whatsoever was lost or succeeded ill, happened in his absence and was caused either by treachery, negligence or carelessness of his officers. There was such juggling, treachery and falsehood in his own army and among some of his own officers, that it was impossible for my Lord to be prosperous and successful in his designs and undertakings.’
This contrasts sharply with the behaviour of Newcastle’s opponents in Yorkshire, the Fairfax family after their crushing defeat at Adwalton Moor in 1643. They did not flee into exile but redoubled their efforts to raise a new army and continue the struggle.
Another problem for royalist leaders was about need to secure personal favour and the gratitude of the monarch – this led them to concentrate on the King’s person and neglect of royalist war effort in their own localities. For example, the royalist gentry of Norfolk abandoned their county to join the King’s person at Oxford . |
| Conclusion |
| 21:42 |
The New Model Army: the decisive factor? |
To conclude, the formation of the New Model Army from April 1645 is often cited as the principle factor in the royalists’ defeat. Here, at last, Parliament established a national, standing army, not tied to serving in any particular region. It became better supplied and more regularly paid than its rivals. It did not have to resort to plunder to maintain itself as the royalists increasingly did. It was led by Fairfax, Cromwell and Skippon: capable and energetic generals who sought out rather than shunned decisive confrontations with the enemy.
Yet if this army had floundered at Naseby, as it so nearly did, parliament’s victory would have been far from assured, despite all of its advantages of territory, manpower and resources. The fledgling New Model Army had plenty of political enemies at Westminster who would have jumped on a royalist success at Naseby to eject Fairfax and Cromwell from command. A negotiated peace or an even longer, more protracted war might then have followed. |
| 22:59 |
A web of interconnected factors |
So, in explaining the royalist defeat, no single factor can be stressed in isolation. Parliament was able to bring superior manpower and resources to bear, but even this might not have been enough in the face of a decisive military defeat. Historians increasingly appreciate the fluid, changing and contingent nature of civil war allegiances, how they were not fixed entities, but continuously reshaped by political and military circumstances. For this reason, civil-war battlefields remain deserving of significant research and military history needs to widen its remit. A better understanding of royalist failure will be gained through studying issues such as recruitment, mobilisation, pay and supply, along with how the social identity of the armies influenced their commander’s strategies and their battlefield performance. |